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COMPARED WHEN? TEACHING INDIAN LAW IN THE 
STANDARD CURRICULUM 
JAMES M. GRIJALVA* 
 
Dear Prof. Grijalva, 
I seem to remember you saying in class one day that everyone 
who is going to practice law in North Dakota should take your 
Indian Law class because an Indian Law issue will come up.  Well 
I did not take your advice, and an Indian Law issue has come up.  
I hope that you do not mind helping me out now. 
-Email message from a former student1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although I did not initially plan to practice Indian law,2 it never occur-
red to me not to take Indian law courses in law school.  As the son of an 
Indian Health Services dentist, I lived in and near Indian country for most 
of my childhood.  When I chose law as a vocation, my early affinity for 
Indian country issues led to a college thesis on Alaska Native hunting and 
fishing rights, and then to Federal Indian Law, Native Natural Resources, 
and related courses in law school.  That background set the stage for a pri-
vate environmental law practice that evolved, somewhat by happenstance, 
into an emphasis on Indian country issues and then later to an academic 
appointment in related areas. 
Outside of Indian law courses, I don’t recall any of my law teachers 
commenting on or incorporating Indian law issues into their courses.  
Despite my interest in Indian Country, I failed to notice the omission then; 
it wasn’t until much later that I began to see the many connections between 
 
 *Director, Tribal Environmental Law Project and Randy H. Lee Associate Professor of Law at 
the University of North Dakota.  I thank Dr. Rhonda Schwartz for her assistance in researching 
this article, and Kara Gansmann and Christene Beaupre for their assistance in editing and cite-
checking the draft article. 
1. My first draft of this article opened with a fictional quote I created to paraphrase the 
content of common phone calls I’ve received from former students over twelve years of law teach-
ing.  I replaced the fictional quote with this electronic mail message I received the same week as 
the Indian law pedagogy conference that is the focus of this symposium.  Conversations with other 
Indian law teachers at the conference confirmed that many receive similar calls and messages like 
the one quoted here. 
2. Throughout this article, I use the phrase “Indian law” to refer both to federal Indian law 
and the law made by American Indian tribes, sometimes separately referred to as “tribal law.” 
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Indian law and other areas of the law.  My representation of tribal govern-
ments on a host of environmental and natural resource issues implicated 
contracts, property, torts, corporate law, bankruptcy, state and federal con-
stitutional law and taxation, as well as civil procedure and professional 
responsibility. 
When I began teaching full-time in 1994, the connections became even 
clearer to me, so I began integrating Indian law issues and cases into my 
“other” courses.3  Here on the northern Plains, it seemed obvious to me that 
many students would likely confront these issues in practice, yet the enroll-
ments in my Federal Indian Law course were consistently small.  One of 
my senior faculty colleagues kindly allowed me to appear in her first-year 
course in the spring to pitch Indian law to the students, and enrollments 
spiked for a time.  Later, I assumed responsibility for the Property I and II 
course sequence, and converted my one-time, five-minute pitch into a series 
of integrated cases and issues. 
I did not know then that integration of Indian law issues into other 
courses was the origin of the study of Indian law in American law schools.4  
The academy has come far since that time; many schools now offer one or 
more Indian law courses, and several offer certificates and even LL.M. 
degrees in Indian law.  But the former student’s email message quoted 
above, and numerous phone messages like it, raise the question whether 
specialized Indian law courses are the answer to preparing students for 
broad general practice.  Many students, it seems, are simply unaware of 
Indian law and its potential impacts on their future clients.  Students who do 
realize that the body of Indian law exists often see it as a specialized area 
irrelevant to their intended career paths.  Neither group tends to enroll in 
Indian law courses. 
This article explores whether that reality deserves attention, and if so, 
how law teachers might approach it.  Section II suggests there are several 
important pedagogical justifications and goals for Indian law integration.  
Section III takes up possible barriers and risks associated with integration, 
arguing they are misplaced or surmountable.  In section IV, I review student 
reactions to an integration exercise in my Property Law course, which 
anecdotally support the goals of integration and suggest the risks are 
manageable.  The article concludes with a plea and suggestions for 
 
3. My initial teaching responsibilities included Federal Indian Law, Administrative Law, 
Environmental Law, and Intellectual Property. 
4. See Rennard Strickland & Gloria Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution of 
Indian Law in the Law Schools, 26 N.M. L. REV. 153, 156-58 (1996) (describing the first appear-
ance of Indian law in legal education in the 1970s by way of “subversive” integration in Property 
and then Constitutional Law courses). 
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increased attention to Indian law issues in courses not focused on Indian 
law. 
II. POSSIBLE PEDAGOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND GOALS 
There are any number of possible pedagogical justifications and goals 
for integrating Indian law into other courses in the “standard” law school 
curriculum.  Some of these are amorphous theoretical aspirations, while 
others have direct practical applications and outcomes.  Their value in any 
particular course depends largely on the individual teacher’s course-specific 
goals and teaching philosophy.  They may also be influenced by the 
collective vision of the faculty as to their school’s mission.  But, as the 
commercial advertising industry might tell us, integrating Indian law offers 
something for everyone. 
A. SEEKING INTEGRITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
At perhaps the most general and theoretical level, integrating Indian 
law issues throughout the law school curriculum offers an additional 
measure of integrity in legal education.5  Indian law is “important in its own 
right,”6 and devoting time to its study models intellectual curiosity, one of 
our profession’s greatest virtues.7  The continuity of Indian tribes as 
sovereigns predating the United States’ federal and state governments alone 
justifies attention.8  Especially in states encompassing tribal homelands and 
tribal governments with functioning legal systems, I agree it is 
“irresponsible [for law schools] to ignore” Indian law issues.9  Indeed, 
arguably law schools should recognize an obligation to address the unique 
needs of tribes and Indians for legal services.10 
 
5. Failing to address Indian law might be considered a distortion of some doctrines.  See 
Frank Pommersheim, “Our Federalism” in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An 
Open Letter to the Federal Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
123, 124 (2000) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Our Federalism]. 
6. Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1264 (1996) (quoting Professor Martha Minow, Harvard Law School) 
[hereinafter Ford, Integrating Indian Law]. 
7. Id. at 1244. 
8. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 161. 
9. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1264 (quoting Professor Ann Jergens, 
William Mitchell Law School). 
10. Debra L. Donahue, A Call for Native American Natural Resources in the Law School 
Curriculum, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 211, 212 (2004).  Judith Resnik suggests 
integration of Indian law into federal courts jurisprudence could help address a “belated sense of 
obligation to speak about the history of treatment of Indian tribes.” Judith Resnik, Dependent 
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 701 (1989). 
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That responsibility may be more compelling in the face of continuing 
deficiencies in secondary and higher education in the United States.  It 
seems that very few students arrive at the legal academy with studied 
knowledge of the history of U.S.-tribal relations or the contemporary issues 
facing native peoples and Indian country, much less the legal issues 
implicated.11  One reason for addressing Indian law issues in the legal 
curriculum is simply as a modest measure to address that deficiency and 
offer some chance for students to become aware at least of the legal 
history.12  This may well be the last chance for students to receive any 
formal education in that history,13 and we should not let them leave the 
academy with such a significant “hole” in their education.14  In addition to 
improving students’ historical knowledge, the study of Indian law can 
expand students’ skills of analysis.15 
B. ENHANCING STUDENTS’ CRITICAL THINKING 
One important aspect of the integrity of legal education is the con-
scious effort to stimulate students’ critical thinking skills.  The complexities 
and pendulum swings of Indian law contribute an additional means to the 
myriad of options for encouraging close and careful reading of judicial 
opinions,16 with specific attention to how judges apply and misapply prece-
dents.17  It illustrates graphically how societies structure their legal systems 
and rules to serve societal values and choices, and how judges and law-
makers make policy and philosophical choices in applying those rules.18 
Critical thinking skills depend on the ability to make comparisons 
among alternatives, and Indian law provides a relatively accessible 
 
11. Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Integrating Indian Law into a First Year Legal Writing Course, 
37 TULSA L. REV. 503, 504 (2001); Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1255. 
12. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and Beyond, 37 
TULSA L. REV. 521, 538 (2001). 
13. See Cynthia Ford, Including Indian Law in a Traditional Civil Procedure Course: A 
Reprise, Five Years Later, 37 TULSA L. REV. 485, 492 (2001) (suggesting the question is not 
whether students receive a little or a lot of exposure to Indian law, but whether they receive any at 
all) [hereinafter Ford, Five Years Later]. 
14. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 506. 
15. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors, 44 
J. LEGAL ED. 251, 255-56 (1994) (suggesting a historical study of Indian law helps students see 
history as a serious scholarly venture offering the possibility of “a deeper analysis”).  See 
generally Samuel W. Calhoun, The Law and the Little Big Horn: What Beginning Law Students 
Can Learn from General Custer, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 403 (1986) (describing a critical thinking 
exercise used in the first-year orientation, drawing on historical materials surrounding George 
Armstrong Custer’s last misjudgment). 
16. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 523. 
17. Id. at 529. 
18. Id. at 521, 538. 
       
2006] TEACHING INDIAN LAW 701 
domestic example of comparative law.19  The preoccupation of American 
law and society on individual rights might be brought into focus by “a tribal 
viewpoint that values common interests, with individual well-being pro-
tected because of a relational context with people and nature.”20  Indigenous 
views on human relations to the natural world may shed light on alternative 
expectations and regulatory approaches for natural resource development.21  
Differences between western and Indigenous perspectives on the signifi-
cance of promises made, and the consequences for violating them, throw 
contracts principles into specific relief.22  Indigenous approaches to prop-
erty ownership can help students see the values reflected in western 
property law,23 and offer a “rich source for comparative discussion on the 
role of gender in property rights.”24 
Indian law also offers a compelling window for introducing the larger 
conceptions of critical legal analysis such as Legal Realism, Critical Legal 
Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Law and Economics perspectives.25  
Difficult jurisdictional and jurisprudential problems abound in Indian law.26  
Indian law illustrates graphically how western European customs and 
traditions influenced the development of various aspects of Anglo-Amer-
ican law,27 based sometimes on fanciful stereotypes,28 and at other times on 
overtly racist assumptions and language.29  In these and other senses, Indian 
law provides fertile ground to ask whether the “law’s final justification is in 
the good it does or fails to do the society of a given place and time.”30 
Implicit in that question is the reality that while law plays a significant 
role in the creation and maintenance of productive societies, it is only one 
of many important roles.  Similarly, the study of law is but one of many 
 
19. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1243; Bobroff, supra note 12, at 533. 
20. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 164. 
21. Donahue, supra note 10, at 217. 
22. See Jack F. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law into the Commercial Law and 
Bankruptcy Curriculum, 37 TULSA L. REV. 557, 569 (2001). 
23. See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal 
Property Law, 10-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 494 (2000) (discussing the difference be-
tween western and Cherokee notions of lands “held in common”). 
24. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 536. 
25. Id. at 523. 
26. See Pommersheim, Our Federalism, supra note 5, at 126; Resnik, supra note 10, at 676-
78. 
27. Williams, supra note 22, at 558.  See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). 
28. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 532. 
29. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST 
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005). 
30. Donahue, supra note 10, at 219 (quoting ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, 
in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH: ESSAYS 173 (1961)). 
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areas of inquiry contributing to the progress of modern society.  An 
interdisciplinary approach to the law can help students appreciate these 
points, and Indian law offers, if not invites, exploration of numerous other 
disciplines.  Perhaps most obvious are history and historical analysis, often 
overlooked in law school in favor of attention to current rules.  Indian law 
can’t be fully comprehended apart from its historical context, and taking 
such an interdisciplinary view can “challenge students accustomed to 
generic law” and provide them with additional analytic tools.31  It may also 
provoke inquiry into the relation of professional work and ethics, including 
legal representation of Indians and Indian tribes.32  Interdisciplinary in-
quiries provide valuable opportunities to bring non-law literature into law 
school classrooms, increasing student interest33 and broadening their com-
fort with using materials beyond statutes and cases.34 
C. EXPOSING STUDENTS TO THE RELEVANCE OF INDIAN LAW IN A 
BROAD SPECTRUM OF PRACTICE AREAS 
Teachers who integrate Indian law into their other courses may 
confront student questions about the relevance of Indian law to their desired 
practice areas and geographic locations.35  Partly owing to the general fail-
ure of law school curricula to address Indian issues, law students often do 
not know what Indian law is or how it might impact their clients.36  That 
fosters “an entrenched belief that Indian law is separate and apart, offering 
nothing to the more generalized study of law.”37 
But modern law practice across the nation, and especially in the west 
and mid-west, undermines those assumptions.  Professor Bill Rice has 
written: 
Experience has shown that “federal Indian law” impacts almost 
every conceivable field of law currently studied in the schools of 
law in this country.  From criminal cases to Wall Street bond is-
sues, from adoptions to intergovernmental relations, from account-
ing to workers’ compensation, the range of matters in which 
 
31. See generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 252. 
32. Id. at 264-65; S. James Anaya, The Ethics of Doing Federal Indian Law, presented at the 
27th Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 10-11, 2003). 
33. See Calhoun, supra note 15, at 403 (describing high student interest and spirited discus-
sion stemming from the use of historical materials on the question whether George Armstrong 
Custer disobeyed his final orders). 
34. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 532-33. 
35. See, e.g., Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 518. 
36. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1244. 
37. Melissa L. Tatum, Foreword to Symposium: Native American Law Essays on Integrating 
Indian Law into the Law School Curricula, 37 TULSA L. REV. 481, 482 (2001). 
       
2006] TEACHING INDIAN LAW 703 
“Indian law” can become the determining factor is perhaps as inf-
inite as the subjects that may come before the Bar for decision.38 
Increasing commercial activity in Indian Country—in manufacturing, 
natural resource development, tourism, gaming, and other areas—present 
expanding possibilities for contact with Indian law.39 
I think it may be an overstatement to suggest “all lawyers must 
understand that tribes are sovereigns, with governmental authority over 
their territory,”40 but beginning representation with such an understanding 
might reduce surprise and heedless litigation.  And competent representa-
tion for the individuals and business concerns affected require at a mini-
mum lawyers be sufficiently aware of the separate body of Indian law to 
know when specialized counsel might be necessary.41  That view is 
supported by the recent decisions of the New Mexico and Washington Bar 
Examiners to include Indian law within the potential exam topics.42 
Integrating Indian law into the general curriculum, especially in first-
year courses, helps sensitize students to seeing Indian law issues in their 
other substantive courses.43  It may broaden students’ consideration of 
potential litigation fora44 and resolving conflicts of laws questions.45  It may 
also encourage students not otherwise so inclined to enroll in courses 
focused on Indian law.46 
 
38. G. William Rice, There and Back Again—An Indian Hobbit’s Holiday “Indians Teaching 
Indian Law,” 26 N.M. L. REV. 169, 171 (1996). 
39. Tatum, supra note 37, at 483; Williams, supra note 22, at 557-58; Donahue, supra note 
10, at 212. 
40. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 212. 
41. Cf. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1250-51. 
42. In 2002, New Mexico added Indian Law to its potential Bar exam subjects, “including 
subjects such as federal Indian law, criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country and Indian 
child welfare act under state and federal law.”  See New Mexico Bar Exam, http://www. 
nmexam.org/rules/rules203.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2006).  In 2007, Washington will include 
“Indian Law Jurisdiction” in its potential Bar exam subjects.  See Washington State Bar Associa-
tion, http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/licensing/barexam.htm#9 (follow “What are the test subjects?” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). 
43. See Victoria Sutton, American Indian Law—Elucidating Constitutional Law, 37 TULSA 
L. REV. 539, 539 (2001); Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 504; Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra 
note 6, at 1257. 
44. See Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 494 (noting a pedagogical goal of getting 
students to include tribal courts in their thought processes about potential fora). 
45. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Conflicts and Dependent Sovereigns: Integrating Indian 
Tribes into a Conflicts Course, 27 U. TOL. L REV. 675, 675 (1996). 
46. Ford, supra note 6, at 1280. 
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D. INCREASING INDIAN STUDENT MATRICULATION AND RETENTION, 
AND DECREASING MARGINALIZATION 
Despite the prevalence of Indian issues throughout many areas of law, 
American Indians have historically been underrepresented in the legal pro-
fession.  As with other underrepresented groups, the possible reasons are 
manifold.  One likely explanation is the failure of law schools to make law 
resonate with the real world experiences of native students.47  In the early 
1970s, no law school covered Indian law in any depth,48 and there were but 
a handful of Indian students.49  As some law schools increased their atten-
tion to Indian law over the last thirty years,50 the overall enrollment of 
native students increased nearly ten-fold.51 
Even with these laudable enrollment increases, American Indian and 
Alaska Native students still make up less than one percent of the overall 
student enrollment in United States law schools.52  So the simple fact is 
native students generally find themselves experiencing “personal and 
cultural isolation in law school.”53  In some instances, integrating Indian 
law issues into those courses might help move the native student from a 
sense of “marginality as an ‘outsider’”54 into “enjoy[ing] the status of an 
‘insider’ on the problem” through sharing her perspectives with class-
mates.55  At the very least, integration addresses the rhetorical but poignant 
question, “How can a [native] student be expected to take his or her legal 
education seriously when his or her identity as it exists in the law is 
essentially erased?”56 
 
47. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 160 (suggesting the failure of some 
law schools to teach Indian law affects their recruitment and graduation of Indian students). 
48. See id. at 158. 
49. For the 1971-72 academic year, 142 law schools (out of 147) reported to the ABA 
enrollment of 140 American Indian and Alaska Native students.  See http://www.abanet.org 
/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (follow American Indian or Alaska Native hyperlink) (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2006). 
50. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 155-59 (describing the evolution of 
law schools’ treatment of Indian law). 
51. For the 2004-05 academic year, 185 law schools (out of 188) reported to the ABA an 
enrollment of 1,106 American Indian and Alaska Native students.  See  http://www.abanet.org 
/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (follow “American Indian or Alaska Native” hyperlink) (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2006) [hereinafter ABA American Indian Enrollment]. 
52. Compare id. with http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/enrollmentdegrees-
awarded.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (indicating that in the 2004-05 academic year, 148, 169 
students attended law school). 
53. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 164-65. 
54. Id. at 165. 
55. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 507-08. 
56. Id. at 505.  While outside the intended scope of this article, decreasing Indian law 
marginalization can also help tribal legal institutions achieve legitimacy in the view of federal 
courts.  See Pommersheim, supra note 5, at 129 (arguing the marginalization of tribal courts in 
       
2006] TEACHING INDIAN LAW 705 
E. PREPARING STUDENTS FOR PROFESSIONAL LIVES IN A DIVERSE 
WORLD 
Beyond the pernicious effects on native students, marginalization of 
Indian law also breeds negative consequences for non-native students pre-
paring for practice in a multicultural world.  The theoretical aspirations of 
intercultural awareness and sensitivity are key practical skills for productive 
working relations and successful business dealings between Indians and 
non-Indians.57  Mutual appreciation of cultural differences benefits students 
in a “social sense,”58 and may offset fears associated with appearances in 
unfamiliar courts.59  It could also engender a level of respect not always 
displayed by off-reservation attorneys appearing in tribal courts.60 
Law schools might be the “primary environments in which the respect-
ful discourse [between Indians and non-Indians] can begin so that the 
twenty-first century is a different story than the past.”61  The academy 
seems a natural forum to address society’s lack of “Indian law literacy,” 
which hinders true democracy in the context of tribal-federal relations,62 
and the “continuing struggle to find a principled basis for the relationship 
among the federal government, states and Indian tribes.”63 
Indian cases provide “vivid insight” into three central jurisprudential 
themes: tolerance for subgroups that desire difference and self-governance; 
whether differences can be sustained; and whether distinct governance 
structures are supported.64  It seems fair to suggest that for a society of 
diverse peoples to be productive, it must accept that minorities will have 
some power over others.65 
 
federal courts’ textbooks and scholarship makes more likely the continued marginalization of 
tribal courts in federal jurisprudence). 
57. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 217. 
58. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 508. 
59. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 265. 
60. Ford Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1260-61 (describing common reports by 
tribal judges that off-reservation attorneys often show little respect for tribal courts and judges). 
61. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 168. 
62. Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial 
Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 467-69 (1997) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Democracy].  
See generally Frank Pommersheim, What Must Be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First 
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 8 (1997) [hereinafter Pommersheim, 
What Must Be Done]. 
63. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 538. 
64. Resnik, supra note 10, at 702. 
65. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 265. 
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III. PERCEIVED PEDAGOGICAL BARRIERS AND RISKS 
Section II addressed the most global barrier to integrating Indian law 
into other courses: whether any need or justification exists for it.  Assuming 
any particular teacher answers that question in the affirmative, there are still 
potentially significant reasons why she might not actualize that conviction.  
Some of these could be pretext, others are relatively minor, and some are 
true barriers.  But, many of these are not unique to Indian law and, I be-
lieve, can be addressed sufficiently to convert them from barriers and risks 
to challenges and opportunities. 
A. SPECIALIZED INDIAN LAW COURSES OBVIATE THE NEED FOR 
INTEGRATION 
The last thirty years has seen increased attention to Indian law in 
American law schools.66  In the early 1970s schools had no Indian law 
courses, but a few “subversive” teachers were sneaking Indian law into their 
Constitutional Law and Property courses.67 
In 1996, Professor Cynthia Ford reported that 42 of 176 ABA-
accredited schools (or 24%) offered at least one Indian law course.68  A 
dozen or so of those schools offered more than one Indian law course in 
specialized fields ranging across environmental law, taxation, natural 
resources, tribal government, jurisdiction, tribal law, gaming, human rights, 
and the like.  In this symposium issue, Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber 
and Sherri Nicole Thomas reported that approximately 64 of the Nation’s 
193 ABA-accredited schools (or 33%) offer at least one Indian law 
course.69 
Without question, this recent expansion of law school curricula could 
and should fairly be said to serve many of the pedagogical justifications and 
goals noted in Section II.  But standing alone, specialized Indian law 
courses are an incomplete solution, primarily because they do not reach the 
vast majority of students.70  None of these courses are required for the Juris 
 
66. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 155-59 (describing the evolution of 
law schools’ treatment of Indian law). 
67. Id. at 158. 
68. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1252-53 (noting the course was usually the 
Federal Indian Law survey course). 
69. Gloria Valencia-Weber & Sherri Nicole Thomas, When the State Bar Exam Embraces 
Indian Law: Teaching Experiences and Observations, 82 N.D. L. Rev 741, 746-47 (2006). 
70. Approximately 76% of law schools offer no Indian law course.  Additionally, Valencia-
Weber and Thomas noted that some of the schools reporting affirmatively rely on courses like 
Legal History or International Law where Indian law in integrated into the material.  Id. 
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Doctorate degree,71 and only two of the fifty states test Indian Law subjects 
on the bar exam.72  Because of deficient educational experiences, students 
are either unaware that the body of Indian law exists or perceive it as a 
niche field irrelevant to their intended career paths.73 
Those barriers are compounded when the required first-year law school 
curriculum omits any reference to Indian law.  First-year students are argu-
ably more engaged and open to challenging material than upper-class stu-
dents,74 but if they sense their teachers see no relevance of Indian law to 
traditional doctrines, they are likely to skip specialized Indian law courses 
in favor of bar courses.75  So, just as relegating ethics to the upper-class 
elective Professional Responsibility course suggests limited import,76 spe-
cialized Indian law courses can implicitly reinforce the profession’s mar-
ginalization of Indian law.77  Professor Jack Williams supports that view by 
observing that Indian law courses “provide a convenient excuse to deposit 
the rich and vibrant body of tribal law in a place few students travel.”78 
B. TEACHERS LACK FAMILIARITY, MATERIALS, OR TIME 
There are several practical threshold barriers for law teachers inclined 
to integrate Indian law into their traditional courses, but they are neither 
unique to Indian law nor particularly troublesome in other contexts.  One 
concern is that most teachers lack familiarity with Indian law precepts.  For 
better or worse, the legal academy has generally drawn its teachers from a 
limited set of law schools, most of which have historically overlooked 
Indian law.79  Often these graduates were hired as teachers without 
significant legal practice, or with practices not implicating Indian law.  
 
71. Schools with Certificate programs in Indian law do of course require certain courses 
and/or credit hours in specialty Indian law courses. 
72. See supra note 42 (referring to Indian law subjects on the New Mexico and Washington 
Bar exams). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
74. See Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, 58-AUT 
L. & Contemp. Probs. 19, 22 (1996) (citing sources on the “phenomenon of increasing student 
disengagement and lack of interest in the second and third year”) 
75. Tatum, supra note 37, at 483. 
76. Bundy, supra note 74, at 24-25 (describing an interesting effort at Boalt Hall to teach 
Professional Responsibility in the first-year to improve students’ “reception” to ethics and 
professionalism). 
77. Cf. Sutton, supra note 43, at 555 (noting that Bob Woodward’s THE BRETHREN reported 
how Chief Justice Burger would punish junior justices by assigning them “peewee” matters like 
Indian cases). 
78. Williams, supra note 22, at 570. 
79. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1256-57.  Many federal judges, also from 
this same limited pool, admit lacking expertise in the nuances of federal-tribal relations.  See 
Pommersheim, Our Federalism, supra note 5, at 130. 
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Compounding that gap in knowledge is the typical omission or superficial 
treatment of Indian cases and issues from legal casebooks and related 
materials.80 
But it seems fair to assume that most law teachers have not studied or 
had substantial practice in every one of the four or five or more substantive 
areas in which they teach.81  And, even in areas of familiarity, there are 
dozens of issues never confronted before.  Part of the law teacher’s awe-
some responsibility for transmitting knowledge must carry with it an 
obligation to expand her or his own knowledge.  “[S]erious scholarship is 
the duty, the privilege, and the obligation of all who choose to live in the 
academic community.”82  There is a wealth of Indian law literature, and law 
school and university colleagues can assist in interpreting and putting it in 
context,83 as could organizations with vested interests in Indian law 
integration.84 
Related to these purported barriers is the scarcity of time.  Teachers 
often lament the adequate time to cover substantive doctrinal issues, much 
less tangential topics treated in other courses.85  But the argument proves 
too much; regardless of the credit hours, no course can cover all the 
substantive issues pertinent to any doctrinal area.  Teachers routinely make 
conscious and subconscious decisions about whether and to what extent 
various topics will be covered.  And it is hard to imagine any teacher be-
lieving their in-class coverage of any topic is all that is needed to equip 
students for actual practice in the area.  The best that might be said is that 
the course grounded students in the vocabulary and concepts necessary to 
 
80. See Tatum, supra note 37, at 482; Resnik, supra note 10, at 676 n.21 (citing sources 
discussing the lack of integration of materials on Indian tribes in Constitutional Law); Ford, supra 
note 6, at 1266 (noting Civil Procedure books are “mute” on Indian law).  Because of its signifi-
cance to the origin of real property titles in the United States (and the arguably intriguing com-
parison to the classic fox case, Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)), several 
Property Law books excerpt the foundation Indian law case Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823), although many do not. 
81. Cf. Resnik, supra note 10, at 690 (contrasting law teachers’ hesitance to integrate Indian 
law into their courses out of a perception that it is “complex, foreign, very different, and thus an 
area set aside for experts,” with their willingness to integrate economics, philosophy, political 
science, or feminist theory despite not being economists, philosophers, political scientists, or 
feminist theorists). 
82. Rennard Strickland, Scholarship in the Academic Circus or the Balancing Act at the 
Minority Side Show, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 491, 491 (1986). 
83. Faulty colloquia can be productive vehicles for Indian law teachers to convey to their 
colleagues the fundamental concepts and principles of Indian law. 
84. See Tatum, supra note 37, at 484 (describing a 2001 initiative of the Association of 
American Law Schools Section on Indigenous Nations and Peoples to collect and distribute 
materials designed for law teachers interested in integrating Indian law into their courses). 
85. Id. 
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educate themselves when confronted with the substantive issues.86  That 
more humble goal speaks just as well to the need for addressing students’ 
Indian law illiteracy,87 for the question whether to integrate Indian law may 
implicate whether the students receive some exposure or none at all.88 
C. STUDENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE CONFUSED, FRUSTRATED, 
AND ANGERED THAN ENLIGHTENED 
Indian law is a complex, anomalous body of law that goes to the heart 
of a majority society’s (in)tolerance for difference.  Its study is intrinsically 
fraught with potential for confusion and emotionalism, which can be per-
ceived as inconsistent with, or a hindrance to, the learning process.  
Students may feel “totally overwhelmed” and “utterly confused” when first 
confronted with this complex material.89  Because law students seem 
obsessed with divining the “right” answers from class materials, they may 
express frustration and anxiety over issues lacking clear conclusions or 
coherence.90  That result is particularly likely in the face of modern Indian 
law’s continuing incoherence.91 
But, like other barriers noted above, these challenges apply to most of 
what we teach.  It seems presumptuous and inconsistent with reality to 
assume students are not frequently confused and frustrated by many doc-
trines (future estates in property and the Rule Against Perpetuities come to 
mind) and fact-specific “rules” (e.g., nuisance, the reasonable person, no 
disputes of material fact, etc.) regularly taught.  And, arguably, confusion is 
a necessary predicate for true learning.  Rote memorization seems the most 
pedestrian of learning methods,92 and it offers nothing for the student who 
will unquestionably confront disjointed and unclear legal rules in practice.  
Confusion can perhaps hinder the learning process, but learning to handle it 
 
86. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 486 n.4 (describing her explanation to students 
that many important substantive topics will not be covered in class, but they will learn how to 
educate themselves when they encounter such topics). 
87. Pommersheim, Democracy, supra note 62, at 469. 
88. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 492. 
89. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 515-17.  Professor Kenneth Bobroff suggests the real 
challenge in using Johnson v. M’Intosh in Property Law is choosing among its many potential 
themes “so as not to overwhelm beginning law students.”  Bobroff, supra note 12, at 523. 
90. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 497-98 (describing students’ frustration at the 
decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), which rejected without analysis the 
tribal court exhaustion rule of Nat’l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), and Iowa 
Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)). 
91. See, e.g., Atkison Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (expressing a need for coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence on the scope of inherent 
tribal sovereignty over non-Indians). 
92. An insightful pedagogical concept often characterized as a Chinese proverb advises, 
“Tell me and I will forget; show me and I will remember; involve me and I will understand.”  
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productively seems a legitimate legal education goal.  Uncertainty is 
inherent in the common law process as it is in life.93  Better to freeze in the 
relative safety of the classroom than in the real world when significant 
client interests are at stake. 
I think the same can be said for the anger and/or shame often following 
students’ first confrontations with injustices presented by the assimilationist 
goals and flawed ethnocentric assumptions driving federal Indian policies 
and court decisions.94  Perhaps law teachers should time their integration to 
avoid “problems with potentially strong emotional content [that] get in the 
way of [] learning,”95 or otherwise act to ensure students’ “visceral response 
[doesn’t] overwhelm intellectual discourse.”96  But, frankly, I think stu-
dents’ passionate responses to the law are too infrequent and should be 
encouraged rather than blunted.97  Teaching the valuable habits of reflection 
and self-observation can help students distinguish their “emotional or vis-
ceral reaction” from the so-called objective view lawyers assume competent 
representation entails,98 without compromising their humanness. 
D. INTEGRATION WILL BACKFIRE BY TRIGGERING ADVERSE 
STUDENT REACTIONS 
In addition to the possible loss of objectivity or distraction from 
analytic approaches, potential emotional student reactions may erase or 
undermine the believed value of integrating Indian law into other courses.  
There is the threshold issue of names;99 some people prefer “Native 
American” to “Indian,” and “indigenous” to “tribal.”  The difference is 
 
93. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 497-98. 
94. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 254 (suggesting “multiple historical theories frustrate 
students who would prefer one universally accepted truth”).  See also Resnik, supra note 10, at 
696 (noting that “phrases like ‘allotment,’ ‘discovery,’ and ‘relocation,’ capture events that are 
deeply embarrassing to those committed to a vision of a United States founded upon consent and 
dedicated to non-discriminatory treatment”). 
95. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 509 (noting a decision not to cover Indian law in first 
semester legal writing out of a concern for its complexity). 
96. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 254-55 (suggesting teachers must help students avoid 
losing focus on the “hard analytic tasks” because of their emotional responses). 
97. At this Indian law pedagogy conference, Professor Frank Pommersheim encouraged such 
reactions, implying one must be “morally dead” to feel nothing after reading Indian law cases like 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, which he simply characterized as “hurtful.” 
98. See Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 518. 
99. See Sutton, supra note 43, at 539.  The issue of names might seem minor, but it carries 
significant reminders of earlier days when the federal government arrogantly decided the names 
by which certain tribes would be known, as well as the modern relic of non-Indian schools that 
use American Indian names and symbols for their athletic teams.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 104-07. 
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largely generational,100 but a teacher’s “wrong” use can offend both native 
and non-native students.101 
Students may also refuse to engage the material out of a sense that 
devoting time in substantive courses to Indian law issues wastes their time 
with irrelevant material adequately covered elsewhere.102  Students who 
come to law school with some “knowledge” of Indian issues, with its 
accompanying biases and judgments, may have a difficult time embracing 
the point of any lesson that challenges their beliefs.103  At worst, students 
may become defensive and suspect or challenge the teacher’s decision as 
motivated by a desire to “indoctrinate” the students into believing as the 
teacher does. 
That concern can be especially acute in law schools like the University 
of North Dakota (UND).  UND is located on the vast northern plains of 
eastern North Dakota on the western border of Minnesota, once home to 
endless tall grass prairie and thousands of indigenous people.  Manifest 
destiny and supporting federal policies changed the face of the land and its 
people.  Little remains of the original native prairie or native population.  
The enormous extent of tribal territories shrunk to four reservations in 
North Dakota, eight in South Dakota, and eleven in Minnesota.  Immigra-
tion by large numbers of Scandinavians led to an overwhelmingly White 
population. 
The Law School draws the majority of its students from North Dakota 
and northern Minnesota, and so its student body mirrors the region’s 
homogenous demographics.  Despite the active and continuing efforts of the 
Faculty Diversity Committee and others, enrolling students of color, 
primarily American Indians, is a constant challenge. 
 
100. I use “Indian” because nearly all of my clients—officials of Indian tribes—use it as a 
generic reference to indigenous people.  Accord Rice, supra note 38, at 172 n.11.  Tribal citizens 
of younger generations, from which law schools draw most of their students, tend to prefer 
“Native American.” 
101. The flip side may also be true.  One of my non-native students once objected vocifer-
ously to Indian law’s reference to “non-Indians.”  She said, “Call me White or call me Caucasian, 
but don’t call me a ‘non’ something.  I’m not a non-something.” 
102. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 487-91 (noting student comments on inte-
grating Indian law into first-year Civil Procedure as including some responses that it was a waste 
of time).  Worse, it is possible, though probably not provable, that students might give lower 
marks on course evaluations because the teacher “wasted” time on Indian issues.  That result may 
be more likely for minority teachers whom students perceive as deviating from “standard 
institutional fare.”  See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching from the Margins: Race as a 
Pedagogical Sub-Text, A Critical Essay, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 151 (1997). 
103. See Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 517-18 (describing her sense that integrating Indian 
law in an urban school in Detroit was in some ways more productive than in New Mexico where 
students arrived with comparatively more exposure and consequently more entrenched biases and 
judgments, making it harder to view the materials objectively). 
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Yet, despite UND’s location in Indian country, our students generally 
come to us with limited knowledge of the legal and political issues impli-
cating federal Indian law.  Like most Americans, they received little or no 
formal education on the history of U.S. relations with Indian tribes, or its 
legal consequences.  They are aware, of course, of the existence of reserva-
tions, and may even have a sense that tribes have a governmental power of 
sorts over tribal citizens there, though most have no idea tribal sovereignty 
might extend to non-Indian activities on reservations.  They “know” that the 
federal government plays a more active role on reservations than in state 
territories, but they typically don’t understand why, or realize its implica-
tions for judicial and regulatory jurisdiction, property ownership rights, law 
enforcement, or a host of other issues. 
Some students are also burdened with long-standing and continuing 
exposure to harmful and hurtful stereotypes about Indians.  That “know-
ledge” spans topics like welfare, alcoholism, “special” hunting and fishing 
rights, tribal court illegitimacy, tribal governmental corruption, lawlessness, 
and others.  These are not unique to North Dakota of course, but there is 
one significant complicating factor: the University’s athletic teams are 
called Fighting Sioux, and their logo is an Indian head. 
Since the 1970s, debate has raged on campus and in the community 
over whether the name and logo are used “in honor of the first inhabitants 
of the region,”104 or demeans, dehumanizes, and objectifies a living 
culture.105  This is not the place for a substantive discussion of the contro-
versy,106 but it has created a palpable divide on the campus and in the 
community.  Harsh words are frequently exchanged, evoking emotions that 
range across disinterest, disgust, frustration, anxiety, fear and anger.  Indian 
students are regularly asked whether they are for or against the name and 
logo.  Even in the “safe” environment of the classroom, reminders of the 
controversy and community tension are reflected in logos adorning T-shirts, 
hats, coffee mugs, water bottles, pencils, legal pads, key chains, and 
stickers. 
Against this backdrop, introducing Indian law and policy in other 
courses presents special considerations.  Some students are particularly alert 
to any suggestion their teachers might try to sway their opinions on the 
 
104. See UND Code of Student Life, available at http://sos.und.edu/csl/vii-4.php.  A 
common public announcement before sports events at UND asserts “The name and logo were 
adopted in the 1930s to honor the rich culture and heritage of the American Indian.” 
105. See Building Roads Into Diverse Groups Empowering Students, http://www.und. 
nodak.edu/org/bridges/index2.html (follow “Resolutions” hyperlink for Indian tribes and 
organizations officially opposed to the name and logo). 
106. Speaking on a different subject at this conference, Professor Frank Pommersheim aptly 
observed “one person’s tradition is another’s abuse of power.” 
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logo.  Such students might view discussion of Indian law as logically 
irrelevant to “regular” law, suggesting the teacher may have some inappro-
priate ulterior motive.107  They might buttress that assumption with the 
conviction that students who wish to learn about Indian law are free to take 
one or more of the several upper-class elective courses focused on the area. 
The easiest way to avoid these risks is obviously to make no reference 
to Indian law except in courses specifically focused on the topic.  But that 
approach deprives students on both sides of the issue, and those in between, 
of a relevant real world opportunity to apply their critical analysis skills, as 
well as the benefits of expanded knowledge discussed in section II above.  
Ultimately, like an investor’s tolerance for risk, the decision of whether and 
how to integrate Indian law into other courses remains personal to each 
teacher. 
IV. SOME ACTUAL STUDENT REACTIONS 
I entitled section II “possible” justifications and goals and section III 
“perceived” barriers and risks because neither the existing literature nor this 
article proves the benefits or dangers of integrating Indian law into other 
courses.  Quite frankly, most of the positive and negative ideas raised here 
and elsewhere are based on the same kind of intuitive judgments teachers 
regularly make about what works and what does not.  If not already obvious 
by this point in the article, I believe the risks of integration are non-unique 
and outweighed by the potential benefits.  And, as I assume is true for other 
law teachers with experience or interest in Indian law,108 I can’t help but see 
Indian law issues in all my “other” courses.  So, I devote a week or more in 
Environmental Law to Indian Country issues,109 integrate a number of 
Indian law cases in Administrative Law,110 and back when I taught 
Intellectual Property, addressed some interesting Indian issues there as 
 
107. Cf. Robinson, supra note 102, at 152 (arguing that white male colleagues and students 
see race in every aspect of a minority professor’s teaching). 
108. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 22, at 570 (noting that he integrates Indian law into 
“virtually all the classes I teach, [including] admiralty, bankruptcy, civil procedure, commercial 
law, professional responsibility, law and technology, and taxation.”). 
109. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (regulation of 
reservation landfill); HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (regulation of Indian 
country underground injection); Administrator, State of Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 
1998) (tribal redesignation of air quality); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 
1996) (tribal water quality standards imposed on off-reservation discharger). 
110. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (discontinuation of health benefits to 
disabled Indian children); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (eligibility requirements for 
services benefits to off-reservation Indians); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (federal trust responsibility to Indians affecting reasonableness of 
agency action). 
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well.111  And, of course, in Property Law, I cover the infamous Johnson v. 
M’Intosh112 case. 
Despite some of the risks of adverse student reactions suggested in 
Section II.D, over the years I’ve received a number of positive student 
reactions, randomly volunteered.  In end-of-course evaluations, however, 
students rarely mention my integration of Indian law.  That may be due 
partly to the fact that my school uses the University’s generic evaluation 
forms designed for undergraduate students and not specific to the law 
school experience.  Seeking direct contemporaneous feedback from stu-
dents has not been a hallmark of legal education, and the recent trend in 
higher education toward assessment of student learning has only just begun 
to enter the consciousness of the legal academy.113 
Professor Cynthia Ford broke with tradition in 2001 by directly solic-
iting student reactions to her Indian law integration in first-year Civil 
Procedure in preparation for her presentation at the Tulsa conference.114  
Her reported results were enlightening and encouraging, and stimulated me 
to do something similar in anticipation of this Indian law pedagogy sym-
posium.  About two weeks after discussing Johnson v. M’Intosh in Property 
this fall, I asked students to spend five minutes in class writing “any 
reactions” they had to the case or class discussion, and turn them in to me 
anonymously.115  I explained my reason for asking was related to my 
upcoming presentation on integrating Indian law into other law school 
courses for this symposium. 
The non-scientific results were pleasantly surprising (to me) because 
they generally supported integration, specifically (and in some cases 
explicitly) supported the benefits asserted in section II, and did not impli-
cate the risks in section III (except for confusion and frustration, which I 
argued could be seen as positive rather than negative results).116  Of the 71 
total responses (out of 80 first-year students), the comments could be 
generally categorized as such: 
 
111. See, e.g., Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 1999 WL 375907 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 
(1999) (trademarked “Redskins” team name as disparaging); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud 
Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (1998) (misappropriation of Crazy Horse’s name and likeness). 
112. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
113. See generally GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 
(2000).  Most American law schools limit assessment to clinical and legal writing programs.  Id. at 
16. 
114. See Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13. 
115. I thought this approach would be more effective in generating timely anonymous 
responses than an email inquiry.  One problem I didn’t anticipate was how many “laptop students” 
come to class with neither paper nor a writing instrument. 
116. Out of a sense of curiosity rather than scientific validity, I did not read the comments 
until after drafting sections II and III. 
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No. of comments117 Reaction categories118 
46 Stimulated critical thinking119 
34 Generally positive reactions120 
17 Generated confusion and/or emotional reactions121 
13 Increased awareness of diversity/other views122 
11 Addressed gaps in historical knowledge123 
10 Should integrate Indian law124 
 
117. These numbers report the frequency of the various substantive subjects raised in the 
comments.  Some student responses included more than one substantive subject, and so were 
counted more than once. 
118. My request of the students was for “any reactions” and did not specify the categories 
listed in sections II and III as benefits or risks, so obviously it was my reading of the comments 
that destined them for one category or another. 
119. Comments attributed to this category specifically mentioned critical thinking, or the 
value of comparative approaches, or discussed the logical force, justice, or fairness, of the Court’s 
analysis and result.  One representative comment said, “I definitely expanding [sic] my logical 
thought processes on the subject of property by being introduced to an often hidden subject or 
idea.”  Another said, “I think its [sic] important to have cases such as these.  It allows us to see 
what we may have never seen.  We can use these cases to contrast what we are learning against 
what we know.”  Another said, “The case gave a harsh and realistic illustration of our ability to 
rationalize and legitimize even the most improper and unfair courses of action.  The way the 
decision was based on other elitist countries’ policy and methods of claiming/taking land was 
more than a reach in my opinion.” 
120. Comments attributed to this category specifically noted perceived value in including the 
case and discussion, but did not include comments discussing the substantive rationale or result 
(which implied stimulation of critical thinking).  Representative comments used words like 
“interesting,” “useful,” “valuable,” “worthwhile,” and “thanks for including it.” 
121. Comments attributed to this category used words like “confused,” “mixed emotions,” 
“disgust,” “shame,” “embarrassed,” “frustrated,” and “disturbed” or “disturbing.”  One represen-
tative comment said “I was shocked at the sentiments toward the tribes.  Marshall’s opinion made 
it seem like the white inhabitants were doing the tribes a favor by allowing them to remain on the 
land with even limited ownership.” (emphasis in original). 
122. Comments attributed to this category specifically noted perceived value in considering 
other cultures’ views on property possession, being aware of diversity and civil rights concepts, 
and addressing marginalization of minority peoples.  One representative comment said, “The case 
was interesting for the social impact of Supreme Court cases.  The case was such a blatant form of 
racism to the Indians, yet it was written by some of the brightest legal minds of their time. . . .  I 
think cases like this put a human aspect of law into play that often isn’t seen.”  Another said, “I 
was relieved to know that concepts of discrimination, ethnic and racial prejudice in the US legal 
system and the exclusive and systematic disempowerment of ‘minority’ groups, particularly 
Native Americans, would be addressed in this class. . . .  [I]t seems crucial to make a conscious 
effort to give a voice to those groups who have been silenced.” 
123. Comments attributed to this category specifically admitted filling gaps in the students’ 
knowledge of the history of U.S.-tribal relations and/or asserted the value of integration in addres-
sing society’s deficient attention to that history. One representative comment said “It has long 
been custom [sic] in the US to forget about the treatment of the Indian and talk about how great 
American history is and how we need to thank Christopher Columbus.  It’s important to get an 
‘actual’ education—including all aspects of our history and not just what makes us all better or 
feel justified for truly horrible behavior.”  Another said “I really appreciated the incorporation of 
Johnson v. Macintosh (sp?) into our reading not only from a legal standpoint, but a historical 
standpoint.  This is somewhat embarrassing to admit, but I have never really understood the 
structure of Native American land ownership.”  Four other comments used the term “eye-opener” 
in referring to the historical aspects of integration. 
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7 Increased integrity of legal education125 
3 Generally negative reactions126 
1 Stimulated interest in taking an Indian law course 
 
Notwithstanding my footnoted caveat about how I categorized the 
comments, I was heartened that nearly half reacted positively and over half 
spoke of or demonstrated critical thinking.  More importantly, the over-
whelming number of comments demonstrated some level of self-reflection, 
which we all recognize is a critical attribute of effective lawyers, but which 
is rarely practiced in doctrinal courses.  Interestingly, not one comment 
viewed the case as irrelevant to the course or as time wasted.  Also inter-
esting to me was the complete absence of references to UND’s Indian-head 
logo controversy.127 
Of the seventy-one comments, there were only three I labeled as 
negative.  Even these expressly or impliedly supported the integration exer-
cise.  In the spirit of benefits and risks discussed above, I found two of the 
three128 negative comments particularly revealing: 
I thought the materials presented prior to the Johnson case [on 
found property and possession of foxes] were a ‘set-up’ leading us 
to have certain reactions to Johnson.  Let me explain.  We dis-
cussed found property, saying the property, in cases where it is lost 
or abandoned, goes to the true owner above all others and that wild 
property must be dead in the possessor’s hands or mortally 
wounded and still being pursued.  Then we jumped to possession 
of “wild lands” in the Johnson case & everything we’d been taught 
 
124. Comments attributed to this category specifically stated Indian law should be integrated 
in other courses, or “to some extent” or “more.”  One representative comment said, “Our case-
books should have more Indian law cases.” 
125. Comments attributed to this category did not use the word “integrity,” but clearly 
implied that not integrating Indian law in courses and casebooks undermined the legitimacy of 
their legal education.  One representative comment said “W/o [sic] at least some reference to this 
type of case or these types of issues, it would leave a major hole in the formation of property and 
ownership in the U.S.”  Another said “Indian law is an important aspect to our society and should 
be a part of a truly well-rounded legal education.” 
126. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text for my thoughts on the three comments 
attributed to this category. 
127. Because the comments were anonymous, I anticipated a handful of logo references, 
either positive or negative.  Their absence implied students accepted the assignment at face value; 
that is, as a legitimate course-related task rather for some ulterior irrelevant purpose.  But the 
absence of logo references also suggested students may not connect the University’s controversial 
use of Indian names and symbols, which surrounds students constantly, with the larger themes 
reported in the comments. 
128. The third comment I categorized as negative said the discussion focused more on my 
perceptions of injustice than on “determining where/why the justice (lack of) or reasoning 
occurred in the first place.” 
       
2006] TEACHING INDIAN LAW 717 
before told us that land (by that I mean rights to possess ie [sic]—
buy & sell) should belong to the Indians. 
I didn’t like the case on Indian Law for many reasons.  One is that 
your [sic] viewed it with modern eyes instead of for its time saying 
it was an embarassment [sic].  Well the Magna Carta is an embar-
rassment [sic] in modern times but you can’t view it that way.  
Also you skimmed over the writing about the fact that the Euro-
peans were not always the aggressors nor were they the first 
aggressors.  Also you didn’t state that the tribes always fought 
each other and in the case of a few tribes, some were even forced 
to extinction.  You also did not state that we had just won a war 
against them for the land and the fact that the Europeans gave 
them any right after the bloody war is amazing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
My empirical, but not scientific, inquiry into student reactions but-
tresses what many Indian law teachers have believed intuitively for years.  
The need for Indian law integration exists in real and practical forms.  
Many students lack a basic foundation in the history of the United States’ 
treatment of indigenous peoples, which hinders their understanding of the 
legal principles governing modern day disputes involving Indians and 
Indian country.  Increased economic development in Indian country means 
the nature and extent of those disputes continues to expand. 
Integration of Indian law into other law school courses helps address 
the currently unmet need in a way and on a scope that one or two special-
ized Indian law courses cannot.  The direct practical benefit increases 
lawyer competence and decreases opportunities to commit malpractice in 
multiple areas of the law across the Nation, particularly in the many western 
and mid-western states with Indian country.  A host of other Indian law 
integration benefits are more amorphous, but nonetheless are bedrock 
aspects of the academy: developing students’ critical thinking, transmitting 
accurate and comprehensive knowledge, and providing a supportive 
learning environment inclusive of all students. 
The barriers and risks sometimes perceived for integration are legiti-
mate, but they are not unique to Indian law nor do they seem particularly 
challenging.  Some of those risks I think we avoid to the detriment of our 
students; complex material is confusing and injustice sanctioned by the rule 
of law is frustrating.  Do we really want our students to have no emotional 
reaction, or should we help them find productive means for coping with 
their humanness? 
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The practical barrier of teachers’ lack of knowledge and time to 
remedy that gap is more fundamental but still surmountable.  Indian law 
teachers can forward new cases and materials relevant to colleagues teach-
ing other subjects in their schools.  They can make time to consult with and 
assist those colleagues individually or collectively through faculty collo-
quia.  They can reach colleagues outside their schools with articles in legal 
education journals and course materials and thoughts posted to the Internet. 
A more formal option was announced in 2001 at the University of 
Tulsa conference on integrating Indian law into law school curricula.  That 
conference featured five professors’ articles on integration in Civil 
Procedure, Legal Writing, Property, Constitutional Law and Bankruptcy, 
accompanied by course materials and teacher’s manuals to assist other 
professors interested in integration.129  The Association of American Law 
Schools Section on Indigenous Nations and Peoples initially assumed 
responsibility for advertising and distributing this materials bank,130 but that 
initiative appears to have faltered.  Regardless, it seems fair to say the 
materials bank should be significantly expanded, which it could if each (or 
most) of those who teach and write on Indian law committed to preparing 
just one packet of course materials.131 
In the foreword to the law review symposium issue collecting the Tulsa 
conference papers, Professor Melissa Tatum expressed a hope that con-
ference would generate additional symposia and not become “a spark that 
fizzles.”132  I hope this article and other ideas raised at the 2006 University 
of North Dakota conference help fan the flame.  In that regard, I found 
Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber’s and Sherri Thomas’s presentation on 
how Indian law became a bar exam subject in New Mexico particularly 
interesting.133  It appears South Dakota may soon follow.134  Other states 
containing Indian country and law schools featuring established Indian law 
concentrations, like North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin, Colorado, Arizona, 
and Oklahoma, are likely prospects to join the trend.  Perhaps more than 
any other signal, including Indian law on bar examinations demonstrates the 
subject is not a niche field irrelevant to general practitioners. 
 
129. See generally Tatum, supra note 37. 
130. Id. at 484. 
131. As noted earlier, there are numerous areas of the law implicating Indian law.  
Additionally, even for areas with existing materials and writings on integration (like Property or 
Constitutional Law), other professors would benefit from a choice of several approaches just as 
we are with multiple casebooks in one area. 
132. Tatum, supra note 37, at 484. 
133. See generally Valencia-Weber & Thomas, supra note 69. 
134. Frank Pommersheim reported to conference attendees that South Dakota is close to a 
final decision adding Indian law to the topics tested on its bar exam. 
